Abstract Incorporating carbon offsets in the design of cap-and-trade programs remains a controversial issue because of its potential unintended impacts on emissions. At the heart of this discussion is the issue of crediting of emissions reductions. Projects can be correctly, over-or under-credited for their actual emissions reductions. We develop a unified framework that considers the supply of offsets within a cap-and-trade program that allows us to compare the relative impact of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions on overall emissions under different levels of baseline stringency and carbon prices. In the context of a national carbon pricing scheme that includes offsets, we find that the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets can be fully balanced out by under-credited emissions reductions without sacrificing a significant portion of the overall supply of offsets, provided emissions baselines are stringent enough. In the presence of high predicted business-asusual (BAU) emissions uncertainty or low carbon prices, to maintain the environmental integrity of the program, baselines need to be set at stringent levels, in some cases below 50 percent of predicted BAU emissions. As predicted BAU emissions uncertainty declines or as the carbon market achieves higher equilibrium prices, however, less stringent baselines can balance out the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions. These results imply that to maintain environmental integrity of offsets programs, baseline stringency should be tailored to project characteristics and market conditions that influence the proportion of over-credited offsets to under-credited emissions reductions.
Introduction
Complementing cap-and-trade programs with carbon offsets supplied from uncapped sectors is recognized as a way of achieving emissions reduction targets at lower economic cost (Brown and Adger 1994; Chameides and Oppenheimer 2007; Lehmann 2007; Basu 2009; Victor 2012) . However, awarding offsets to projects requires the setting of a baseline that reflects the project's business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. Offsets are counted based on documented emissions relative to baselines. If the offsets project managers have more information on the project's BAU emissions than the regulator that assigns the project baseline, then the program may attract projects that have baselines above their BAU emissions. Managers opt these projects into the program and can claim offsets up to their baseline while not reducing emissions (Rentz 1998; Meyers 1999; Menges 2003; Fischer 2005) . When these offsets are sold to firms regulated under a cap-and-trade program, overall emissions can increase (Gillenwater et al. 2007; Kintisch 2008; Schneider 2009a; Maslin 2011; Zhang and Wang 2011) . Studies have documented this issue of asymmetric information in various contexts, including SO 2 tradable permit markets (Montero 1999 (Montero , 2000 , incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation (Busch et al. 2012; Van Benthem and Kerr 2013) , design payments for environmental services (Ferraro 2008) and sectoral crediting of voluntary emissions reductions (Millard-Ball 2013) . Other studies have suggested various solutions for this problem, including using multiple policy instruments (Horowitz and Just 2013; Calvin et al. 2015; Bento et al. 2015) and contract design (Mason and Plantinga 2013) .
The issue at hand is one of crediting of emissions reductions. A program may award a project with offsets that exceed the project's emissions reductions, leading to the production of offsets that we define as over-credited offsets. But the crediting system may also lead to emissions reductions that do not generate offsets. This happens when an opted in project is assigned a baseline below its BAU emissions. These projects lower emissions more than the quantity of offsets they earn and can reduce aggregate emissions by the difference between the project's baseline and its predicted BAU emissions. We call the reduction in aggregate emissions under-credited emissions reductions.
Such reductions have been identified as a source that can counteract the emissions consequences of over-credited offsets. Schneider (2009b) suggests that setting baselines below BAU emissions can lead to an atmospheric benefit as offsets projects are credited with fewer offsets than their true emissions reductions. Gillenwater (2012a Gillenwater ( , 2012b correctly isolates the impact of over-crediting projects and awarding offsets to projects that are non-additional. In both cases, aggregate emissions can increase. Bento et al. (2015) , Erickson et al. (2014) and Warnecke et al. (2014) model under-and over-crediting of offsets projects and find that under-crediting can play a significant role in maintaining environmental integrity of climate change mitigation programs.
Even with these studies, however, little is known about the relative importance of overcredited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions and how the relative magnitudes of each quantity vary in response to key market parameters, including the carbon price, uncertainty in BAU emissions and mitigation costs. We quantify the relative magnitudes of the two emissions impacts under a wide range of market parameters by calibrating a simple model of carbon abatement in the United States that accounts for adverse selection among offsets projects (Bushnell 2012; Bento et al. 2015) . Therefore we are able to identify policies that may balance these two quantities when facing different market conditions. We find that the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets can be fully balanced out by under-credited emissions reductions without sacrificing a significant portion of the overall supply of offsets, provided emissions baselines are stringent enough. When predicted BAU emissions uncertainty is low or as the carbon market achieves high equilibrium prices, less stringent baselines are required to balance out the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions. Our results suggest that to maintain environmental integrity of carbon offsets programs without sacrificing substantial cost savings from these programs, policy makers should tailor baseline stringency to project characteristics and market conditions that influence the proportion of over-credited offsets to under-credited emissions reductions.
Methods
Our model includes an uncapped sector that comprises heterogeneous projects and a capped sector represented by a single cost-minimizing firm. Offsets are supplied by projects in the uncapped sector. For each capped sector reduction target that we consider, we assume that a quantity of emissions permits is grandfathered to the regulated firms that equals regulated firm BAU emissions minus the reduction target. While others have pointed to other allocation methods for these types of systems (Goulder et al. 2010) , whether permits are grandfathered or auctioned does not change our conclusions but instead influences the distribution of rents among firms and the regulator. The capped sector complies with the program by holding permits, reducing emissions through abatement or buying offsets. Permit and offset prices are solved endogenously so that the demand for permits and offsets by capped firms equals the supply of permits by the regulator and the supply of offsets from projects, respectively.
In equilibrium, the offsets price equals the permit price without additional distortions, such as offsets usage limits, trade ratios or offsets usage transaction costs. In some cap-andtrade programs, offsets sell for a lower price than permits, possibly due to the distortions mentioned (Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2011; Braun et al. 2015; Naegele 2015) . We do not model a gap between permits and offsets for the sake of consistency with previous analyses of Waxman-Markey (Kile 2009) . Instead, we model transaction costs on the offsets supply side, which has similar qualitative effects to a demand side transaction cost.
The Supply of Offsets Offsets supply is derived from profit maximization behavior of offsets project managers. We model the managerial decisions of projects to supply offsets through a project-specific profit function:
Supply decisions by project managers are based on six variables: BAU emissions (u i ), sequestration potential (s i ), a marginal cost of mitigation (c i ), an assigned emissions baseline (b i ), a per unit transaction cost (t i ) and an equilibrium price of offsets that is common to all projects (p). The manager of project i knows with certainty its project's BAU emissions, while the regulator only knows predicted BAU emissions, which equal project-specific BAU emissions plus a project-specific emissions shock. Baselines are set as a function of predicted BAU emissions. Ex-post emissions are assumed to be common knowledge that the policy maker can perfectly observe. The emissions shocks are independently and identically drawn from a normal distribution. Each manager's decision whether to opt in its project and whether to mitigate is based on Eq. 1. Project managers compare the profits of the difference decisions and choose the combination that solves the problem stated in Eq. 1. In the Supplementary Material we analytically derive optimal choices from Eq. 1 and divide approved projects into different categories based on project characteristics. We summarize this categorization with Fig. 1 . Project i's BAU emissions, u i , is shown on the horizontal axis while its marginal costs of mitigation, c i , is on the vertical axis.
The manager of an approved project can either commence with the project (i.e., opts into the program) or decide not to start the project (i.e., does not opt in). Approved projects that have either high marginal costs of mitigation or relatively low baselines are not profitable enough for the manager to opt in. These are designated by the purple and blue cross-hashed regions in Fig. 1 . There are some projects that are profitable enough for the manager to opt in and have its project perform mitigation but are under-credited because they are assigned a baseline below their BAU emissions. These are projects that fall into the green region and are characterized by marginal costs of mitigation that are sufficiently below the offsets price less transaction costs. Managers of projects that are assigned a baseline above the project's BAU emissions opt in their projects and are over-credited. These projects fall into the red region of Fig. 1 and would have commenced without the program taking place. This is because these projects have marginal costs of mitigation above the offsets price less transaction costs. The orange region in Fig. 1 includes projects that perform mitigation but are over-credited. These projects would not have occurred in the absence of the program, since their marginal costs of mitigation fall below the offsets price less transaction costs. However, they are awarded a greater quantity of offsets than the quantity of emissions reductions they provide. In this case, the projects earn some offsets that correspond to mitigation and some that do not correspond to mitigation (e.g., over-credited offsets). When regulated sectors under a cap-and-trade program can use offsets to meet the cap, the supply of over-credited offsets leads to overall emissions increases while under-credited emissions reductions lead to overall emissions reductions.
Managerial decisions yield offsets supply and under-credited emissions reductions, which are used to calculate the change in emissions (see Supplementary Equation 17 ). We exclude a supply of international offsets in our benchmark simulations because of the high level of uncertainty in existing estimates for this supply. Our sensitivity analysis, however, includes scenarios that represent a program that includes international offsets supply (see Supplementary Tables 7, 8 While under-credited emissions reductions are affected by the price of offsets, overcredited offsets are not. As long as the offsets price less transaction cost is positive, over-credited projects are profitable and are opted in. Thus, increasing the offset price has no effect on the supply of over-credited offsets for sufficiently high price levels. In sharp contrast, the opt-in decision of an under-credited project depends on the offset price. As the offset price increases, more under-credited projects become profitable, represented by an expansion up of the lower-right green region in Fig. 1 . See the Supplementary Material for a graphical illustration of this effect.
The Capped Sector Offsets are supplied to the capped sector that must comply with an emissions reduction target. We model the capped sector as a representative firm, an assumption that is consistent with prior literature (Fell and Morgenstern 2010; Fell et al. 2012) . We calibrate the abatement cost structure of the capped sector with processed simulation output from the EPA's analysis of the Waxman-Markey bill (EPA 2009c) . The capped sector emissions reduction target translates into a fixed supply of emissions permits. The capped sector must hold one emissions permit or one offset for every unit of emissions that it does not mitigate. Equilibrium Equilibrium is determined by equating permit supply and demand and offsets supply and demand. Permit and offset prices are determined endogenously through these marketclearing conditions. This equilibrium is static as we do not model dynamic decisions of capped sector firms or offsets projects. Dynamic cap-and-trade models, however, typically find that with unconstrained banking and borrowing and increasing reduction target stringency, equilibrium prices increase at the rate of interest over time (Rubin 1996; EPA 2009b ). This result is consistent with how we frame our scenarios where the lowest prices emerge early in the program under low capped sector reduction targets and the highest prices come later in the program under stringent targets.
Calibration We calibrate the model to represent a stylized federal cap-and-trade program in the United States. We assign values of the mitigation cost parameters based on estimates used in the EPA's analysis of Waxman-Markey (EPA 2009a , 2009c . We base our simulation on Waxman-Markey parameters because this bill is the most prominent federal legislation in the United States to include an offsets provision and therefore remains the most representative offsets policy that the United States may adopt in the future.
We calibrate the distribution of predicted BAU emissions that yields an expected quantity of over-credited offsets equal to 30 percent of total offsets supply when baselines are set to equal predicted BAU emissions in an equilibrium with a carbon price of $25 per ton of CO 2 e. We calibrate a domestic offsets supply function to data on mitigation costs from forecasts of mitigation cost curves from various offsets supply sources in the United States, including livestock management, crop management, afforestation, forest management and soil sequestration (EPA 2009d) . For full details of the model structure and calibration, see the Supplementary Material.
Results
We discovered that for a range of parameter values, under-credited emissions reductions exceed the supply of over-credited offsets if baselines are set stringent enough. Figure 2 shows the composition of offsets and emissions changes for a range of baselines on the horizontal axis, expressed as a proportion of predicted BAU emissions. A proportion less The vertical axis measures million metric tons of CO 2 e. The change in emissions ( E) is defined relative to a cap-and-trade program that does not include offsets. Its value is calculated by adding the supply of overcredited offsets (OCO) and the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions (U CER). Panels in the same row are simulations of programs that have a common capped sector reduction target. We consider three targets: low (500 MMTCO 2 e, a,b,c), medium (2,000 MMTCO 2 e, d,e,f) and high (3,500 MMTCO 2 e, g,h,i). Panels in the same column are simulations that have the same uncertainty on predicted BAU emissions. We consider three levels of predicted BAU uncertainty that are defined by the standard deviation of emissions shocks (σ ). Our benchmark simulation assumes that the standard deviation of prediction errors for BAU emissions is equal to the expected value of BAU emissions (σ = E [u] , b,e,h). The remaining cases have a low level of uncertainty (σ = 0. 75E[u], a,d,g ) and high level of uncertainty (σ = 1.5E[u], c,f,i). Each panel shows average outcomes from 2,000 simulations. In each simulation the offsets price is endogenously determined by equating the supply and demand for offsets (see Supplementary Material) than one implies that every project's baseline is less than its predicted BAU emissions. The vertical axis measures offsets supply and emissions changes in terms of million metric tons of CO 2 equivalent (MMTCO 2 e).
We present outcomes under nine combinations of predicted BAU emissions uncertainty and reduction target stringency. We allow both market attributes to vary from low, to medium to high, where the medium level of each attribute is our benchmark. Our benchmark medium reduction target represents a medium-run abatement target of 2,000 MMTCO 2 e, which was scheduled under Waxman-Markey legislation to be achieved by 2026 (EPA 2009a) . The low and high cases represent short-and long-run reduction targets under the same legislation, respectively. The low and high cases for predicted BAU emissions uncertainty represent less and more uncertainty on predicting BAU emissions around the benchmark level of uncertainty, respectively.
The different curves show outcomes for the supply of over-credited offsets (OCO), aggregate change in emissions ( E), and under-credited emissions reductions (U CER). The aggregate change in emissions is relative to a program that does not include offsets. If the capped sector reduction target is high and when baselines are set to be less than about 65 percent predicted BAU emissions, under-credited emissions reductions exceed the supply of over-credited offsets for all considered levels of predicted BAU emissions uncertainty (Fig.  2g,h,i) . In particular, when BAU emissions uncertainty is low, baselines set below 80 percent of predicted BAU emissions achieve a similar result. Under these scenarios and for this range of baselines, emissions decrease. A high reduction target yields a higher equilibrium offsets price, which encourages greater participation by project developers as the marginal returns to mitigating emissions is higher. Therefore it is more likely for managers of projects with assigned baselines less than their BAU emissions to opt in. This increases the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions while having no effect on the supply of over-credited offsets. When the degree of uncertainty on BAU emissions is low (Fig. 2g) , less stringent baselines are necessary for aggregate emissions to fall. Low BAU emissions uncertainty implies that a project is more likely to receive a baseline that matches its BAU emissions. This has the effect of reducing the supply of over-credited offsets since there will be fewer projects that have baselines above their BAU emissions.
If the degree of uncertainty for predicted BAU emissions is high, it is less likely for the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions to exceed the supply of over-credited offsets (Fig. 2c,f,i) . A higher degree of uncertainty implies that projects have more extreme predicted BAU emissions. A project that has predicted BAU emissions that are substantially larger than its BAU emissions is more likely to receive a baseline that exceeds its BAU emissions. The manager of this project will likely opt in and earn over-credited offsets. On the other hand, a project that has predicted BAU emissions that are substantially lower than its BAU emissions is more likely to receive a baseline so low that its manager will no longer find it profitable to opt in its project. In this case, the project does not generate undercredited emissions reductions. When the capped sector reduction target is low (Fig. 2c) , this effect is amplified as project managers have a lower revenue incentive to opt in their project and have it mitigate emissions. In this case, project baselines must be very stringent -less than 35 percent of predicted BAU emissions -for the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions to exceed the supply of over-credited offsets. For a capped sector reduction target of 2,000 MMTCO 2 e and the benchmark level of uncertainty (Fig. 2e) , the net effect on emissions of creating an offsets market is zero when baselines equal 70 percent of predicted BAU emissions.
Our analysis thus far suggests that the emissions consequences of under-credited emissions reductions can potentially cancel the emissions consequences from the supply of over-credited offsets if baselines are stringent. Setting baselines low, however, may eliminate a significant supply of offsets and lead to lost opportunities (Trexler et al. 2006 ). This could potentially reduce much of the cost savings from including offsets in cap-andtrade programs. To determine the relationship among baseline stringencies, offsets supply and cost savings, we simulate the model under three baseline protocols. We define the protocol denoted by "Predicted BAU Emissions" by setting baselines equal to predicted BAU emissions. We call the second protocol "Minimize Supply of Over-Credited Offsets." This protocol sets baselines to ensure that there is no supply of over-credited offsets. The third protocol, "Maintain Environmental Integrity," adjusts baselines to the point where the aggregate supply of over-credited offsets equals the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions. Under this protocol, the effect of including offsets in the cap-and-trade program has no net effect on emissions as the two sources of emissions changes cancel. Table 1 reports offsets supply and emissions consequences of including offsets in the cap-and-trade program for three capped sector reduction targets. Panels (a), (b) and (c) report estimates for a low, medium and high capped sector reduction target, respectively. In general, the higher the reduction target, the higher the equilibrium price of permits and Notes: Carbon offset prices are reported in dollars per ton of CO 2 e. Offsets supply, emissions reductions and changes in emissions are reported in MMTCO 2 e. The percentage of projects opting in is the ratio of the quantity of projects that are opted in to the quantity of all potential projects. The Predicted BAU Emissions protocol is defined by setting project baselines equal to predicted BAU emissions. The Minimize Supply of Over-Credited Offsets protocol is defined by setting project baselines that guarantee zero supply of overcredited offsets. The Maintain Environmental Integrity protocol is defined by setting project baselines such that the expected supply of over-credited offsets equals the expected quantity of under-credited emissions reductions. This protocol keeps expected aggregate emissions fixed. Each panel shows average outcomes from 2,000 simulations. In each simulation the offsets price is endogenously determined by equating the supply and demand for offsets (see Supplementary Material).
offsets. This result is illustrated by comparing the equilibrium offset prices across the three panels. When the capped sector reduction target is low, equilibrium prices range from $7.66 to $11.69, while with a high capped sector reduction target, equilibrium prices range from $75.86 to $85.85. Table 1 highlights three key findings. First, setting baselines equal to predicted BAU emissions leads to a substantial increase in emissions. For a low capped sector reduction target (Table 1 , Panel (a)), there are only 4 MMTCO 2 e under-credited emissions reductions, compared to 144 MMTCO 2 e over-credited offsets, leading to an aggregate increase in emissions of 140 MMTCO 2 e. Emissions increase because projects with baselines above their BAU emissions opt in and receive over-credited offsets, while projects with baselines below their BAU emissions are not as likely to opt in and generate under-credited emissions reductions. Second, baseline protocols that attempt to fully eliminate the supply of overcredited offsets significantly reduce the supply of offsets. Across all three capped sector reduction target scenarios, we find that the minimize supply of over-credited offsets protocol has a much lower supply of offsets than the predicted BAU emissions protocol. For a capped sector reduction target of 2,000 MMTCO 2 e, total offsets supply is about 50 percent less under the minimize supply of over-credited offsets protocol. Third, the maintain environmental integrity baseline protocol does not significantly reduce the supply of offsets as long as offset prices are high. For a capped sector reduction target of 3,500 MMTCO 2 e, total offsets supply under the maintain environmental integrity protocol is 728 MMTCO 2 e, which is only 10 percent less than total offsets supply under the predicted BAU emissions protocol. High offset prices encourage a greater fraction of projects with baselines set below their BAU emissions. Greater participation by these projects increases the quantity of undercredited emissions reductions. As a consequence, as the equilibrium offsets price increases, there is less need for setting stringent baselines to balance the supply of over-credited offsets and the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions. This feature is illustrated by recognizing the required baseline stringencies for the different equilibrium offset prices. While low offset prices require very stringent baselines (Table 1 , Panel (a), b i = 0.46ũ i ), high offset prices provide room for leeway (Table 1, Panel (c) , b i = 0.77ũ i ). Moving from a low reduction target of 500 MMTCO 2 e to a medium reduction target of 2,000 MMTCO 2 e allows the policy to relax baseline stringency by 50 percent. This suggests that for a one dollar increase in the equilibrium offsets price, baselines can be increased by between one and two percent to maintain the environmental integrity of the program. Table 2 translates offsets supply and equilibrium prices from Table 1 into cost savings estimates from including offsets in the cap-and-trade program. We find that the protocol that minimizes the supply of over-credited offsets severely reduces the cost savings from incorporating offsets into the program. For a capped sector reduction target of 2,000 MMTCO 2 e, cost savings are about 50 percent less relative to the predicted BAU emissions protocol (Table 2 , Panel (b)). In contrast, the maintain environmental integrity protocol does not sacrifice much cost savings as long as the capped sector reduction target is sufficiently high. When the target is set to 3,500 MMTCO 2 e, cost savings are only about 10 percent less relative to the predicted BAU emissions protocol. This result stems from the fact that more stringent reduction targets generate a supply of offsets that are only slightly less under the maintain environmental integrity protocol (Table 1 ). The result suggests that the trade-off between environmental integrity and compliance cost savings is insignificant under aggressive emissions reduction targets.
Sensitivity Analysis
To understand how our results depend on key market characteristics, we perform sensitivity analysis by simulating market outcomes over a wide range of parameters. We vary the tightness of offsets project baselines, from 20 percent to 100 percent of predicted BAU emissions, and analyze the pattern of offsets supply and emissions changes stemming from the quantity of under-credited emissions reductions and the supply of over-credited offsets. Sensitivity analysis around the basic assumptions including BAU emissions uncertainty, the offsets mitigation supply curve, the correlation between key variables, systematic bias in predicting BAU emissions and different measures of transaction costs is reported in the Supplementary Material. In each section of sensitivity analysis, we report the ratio of under-credited emissions reductions to over-credited offsets, offset supplies for broad ranges of the parameters and how different offsets protocols affect the cost savings from including offsets in cap-and-trade programs. Supplementary Tables 7, 8 and 9 report key model outputs for scenarios when a larger supply of offsets is allowed into the program, which represents a setting with international offsets. In these simulations we assume that the supply of mitigation function is multiplied by a constant proportion. We consider a wide range of alternative scenarios, including 25 percent (expensive mitigation opportunities) and 400 percent (cheap mitigation opportunities). Values above 100 percent represent programs that incorporate international offsets. When there are cheaper mitigation opportunities from offsets projects, there will be a greater quantity of under-credited emissions reductions created (see Supplementary Table 8 ), implying that baselines can be made less stringent to ensure the environmental integrity of the program. We find that transaction costs play a minor role in determining the relative magnitudes of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions (see Sections 9.7 and 9.8 of the Supplementary Material).
Conclusion
Our results imply two key policy recommendations, both of which involve differentiating baseline stringency. First, as the problem of over-crediting becomes less severe over time as carbon prices are expected to increase, baseline-setting stringency can be relaxed to encourage a greater supply of offsets. Therefore shortrun policies that impose conservative baseline-setting measures appear justified, while they may be less justified in the future. Second, our framework serves as a guide for differentiating baseline stringency across projects based on project characteristics. In our main analysis we have shown that project types that have lower predicted BAU emissions uncertainty require a less stringent baseline to maintain environmental integrity. In the Supplementary Material, we show that projects with lower marginal costs of mitigation, higher offsets supply potential or lower transaction costs require a less stringent baseline to maintain environmental integrity. In the Supplementary Material, we categorize popular project types along these dimensions. In addition to the significant cost reductions that offsets bring, recent arguments for including them in cap-and-trade programs point to the importance of their co-benefits. For example, offsets may be worthwhile for their ability to encourage the development of adaptation and transition toward a low-carbon world (Dargusch and Thomas 2012) . Other experience with carbon offsetting suggests that programs can prevent biodiversity loss and serve as a payment for ecosystem services projects (Jack et al. 2007; Green and Minchin 2012; Siikamaki et al. 2012 ). The additional non-GHG mitigation benefits may be valuable enough to warrant incorporating offsets in cap-and-trade programs even when over-credited offsets exceed under-credited emissions reductions. Baselines calculated here can be further relaxed to account for these additional co-benefits.
